Tuesday, 5 February 2013
Monday, 4 February 2013
Paul Sedra: "The tragedy of the Brotherhood"
Originally published by Egypt Independent
Republished at Worldcrunch
Republished at Worldcrunch
As President Mohamed Morsy wagged his finger at
Egyptians in his televised address to the nation on 27 January, my mind
wandered back to the televised addresses former President Hosni Mubarak
gave during his last 18 days in power.
Back then, too, there were pitched battles in the
streets of Cairo, Suez and Port Said. Back then, too, the police sought
to bludgeon Egyptians into submission as the government invoked the
Emergency Law and granted the military arrest powers.
And back then, too, there appeared before the nation a
president who sought to accuse rather than convince — whose
paternalistic attitude toward Egyptians was matched only by his apparent
disconnect from reality on the ground.
Of course, there are those who are celebrating the
downfall of the Brotherhood — who are relishing the irony of the
organization, resorting to the very legal instruments that were used to
repress it. Nevertheless, I cannot escape a certain sense of tragedy as I
observe how precipitously the president and his allies have fallen
since their rise to power a mere seven months ago.
This is not to say, of course, that the president can
shirk his responsibility for the morass in which Egypt currently finds
itself. Had he adopted a different path — the path of magnanimity and
collaboration that he promised when he took his symbolic oath of office
in Tahrir Square — the situation would be altogether different. There
would not exist the ever-widening chasm between the Islamists and their
opponents that now characterizes the Egyptian political scene.
And there would exist a constituency of Egyptians
willing to give the nation’s first civilian president the benefit of the
doubt.
That constituency, which once numbered in the millions
and included countless non-Islamists, has dwindled. The Freedom and
Justice Party would have Egyptians believe that remnants of the old
regime — the “feloul” — remain behind all of the country’s problems, and
are bound and determined to sabotage whatever movement toward reform
the president undertakes.
But this is, to my mind, Morsy’s Achilles’ heel: a
tragic delusion that will rob Morsy and the Brotherhood of whatever
political success they have achieved in post-revolutionary Egypt.
Egyptian politics is not a zero-sum game. Yet that is
precisely the attitude Morsy has adopted in running the country, an
attitude tinged by an almost paranoid fear of losing power. Where is the
confidence the president displayed when he presented himself to the
masses at Tahrir seven months ago?
One cannot but wonder whether the president, who resorts
to Twitter in the wee hours of the morning to speak to Egyptians on the
second anniversary of their revolution, is indeed the same man who
refused a bulletproof vest when he spoke to Tahrir.
There is no question that the weight of expectation that
Morsy faced on his rise to power was tremendous. But so too was the
moral and, indeed, revolutionary legitimacy behind the president.
After all, he had emerged the victor from the first
remotely democratic presidential elections in the country’s history.
With such a victory, and certainly after successfully marginalizing the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, what would it have cost the
president to reach out to his political opponents? What threat to his
rule would a government of national unity posed?
Of course, that time of possibility is now in the
distant past. Like the boy who cried wolf, Morsy now appeals for
“dialogue” at every turn, apparently hoping that Egyptians will forget
his intransigence in the constitutional debate, his reliance on a
government seen as hopelessly incompetent, and his repeated efforts to
clamp down on the media and circumvent the legal system.
That this is a time of tragedy for Egypt, there is, of
course, no doubt. The nation mourns as lives are lost day in and day out
— whether at the hands of the unreformed police, or as a consequence of
an almost systematic neglect of state infrastructure.
But this is a tragedy, too, for the Brethren. Having
spent over 80 years in the political wilderness, victims of violent
repression for most of their existence, and finally entrusted with the
power that had so long eluded them, the Muslim Brothers has wasted every
modicum of good will they had before them. And now, I’m afraid, they’re
finished.
Thursday, 31 January 2013
Al-Azhar's Ten-Point Plan
Source: Ahram Online
1- The right to life is guaranteed by all religions and laws; there is
no good to any a nation or society that fails to recognise the sacred
character of human life.
2- Distinctions must be drawn between political action and violent
criminal action, with an emphasis on the sanctity of public and private
property and blood.
3- Emphasis must be put on the duty of the state and its security
apparatuses to protect the citizenry, their constitutional rights and
freedoms, and public and private property without breaching human rights
and laws.
4- The denunciation – along with the legal and religious criminalisation – of violence in all of its forms.
5- The condemnation of incitement to violence.
6- The condemnation of all calls for violence, defamation of the other,
spreading rumours against public figures and entities, and recognition
of these actions as ethical crimes.
7- A commitment to peaceful means of engaging in politics and raising
Egypt's next generation into a culture of peaceful political discourse.
8- A commitment to serious dialogue between different political groups,
especially in times of crisis, aimed at reinforcing a culture of
respect for diversity.
9- The protection of Egyptian society from sectarian and racist calls,
illegal militant groups and illegal foreign intervention.
10- The protection of the Egyptian state is the responsibility of all
parties: the government, opposition, the people, the youth, the elderly,
political parties, groups and movements.
Friday, 25 January 2013
Monday, 21 January 2013
Tuesday, 15 January 2013
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)